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Abstract 
The rise of “fake news” has become a major concern 
for social media platforms. In response, Facebook has 
proposed and tested the idea of users flagging and 
rating news articles and sources, much akin to how 
consumers rate products and services on the Internet. 
One obvious challenge with this crowdsourced rating 
approach is whether the users really know enough to 
rate news articles and sources. Perhaps, a side benefit 
of asking users to evaluate an article—and asking about 
their personal experience with the event described in the 
article—is making them realize that they do not know 
enough about the event to make an accurate judgment, 
thus pushing them to become more skeptical. We asked 
68 social media users to assess the believability of 42 
social media headlines. We found that, while users were 
generally more likely to believe articles that agreed with 
their point of view, asking users to rate pushed them to 
think more critically about the truthfulness of the 
articles. Moreover, once users had been asked to rate 
some articles, they remained critical of other articles as 
well, even without the rating prompt. Overall, our 
findings suggest that asking users to evaluate the 
truthfulness of articles may not only produce rating 
information that can be a useful reference at a later 
point in time but also have an immediate benefit of 
alerting users to think more critically about all articles 
they see. 
 
1. Introduction  
Fake news on social media rose to global attention in 
2016 during the US presidential election, where 
disinformation campaigns to influence the election 
results were widespread [2, 3, 37]. About 60% of adults 
get news from social media (primarily Facebook), and 
the proportion is increasing [15], suggesting that the 
problem will likely worsen [34]. In addition, past 
research shows that users are poor at assessing whether 
a news story on social media is real or fake [39] because 
confirmation bias leads them to believe articles that 
align with their a priori beliefs and disbelieve those that 
do not [25]. As a result, more fake news articles are 
shared on social media than real news [39], and fake 
news also spreads faster than real news [47]. 
The prevalence of fake news has not only shaken the 
public’s trust in journalism but also stirred up criticism 
towards social media platforms for not taking more 
proactive actions to stop the spread of fake news [3]. In 
2017, Facebook tried flagging fake news articles based 
on user reports—which were reviewed by third-party 
fact-checking organizations—but this proved to be 
ineffective and was later removed [31]. In early 2018, 
Facebook announced that it will adopt user ratings of 
news sources—an Internet staple in determinations of 
credibility, quality, and value [5]—following the route 
of eBay and Yelp, which have users rate businesses [10] 
or Amazon and BestBuy.com, which have users rate 
products. However, a unique challenge in rating news 
articles and sources is, do users know enough to rate 
them? When users rate a business, it is expected that 
they have actually used the business’ products or 
services and thus have personal knowledge of it. 
Credible reviews of products are grounded in actual 
purchase and use of the product. How can users 
accurately rate news sources unless they have been 
personally involved with the news articles produced by 
a news source? Without personal knowledge of the 
events in a news article, users may lack the basis on 
which to assess whether the news source has done a 
good job in reporting on the events. Of course, the users 
may attempt to aggregate knowledge from additional 
news sources and references, but that level of 
knowledge is still one level below personal experience; 
they still have no direct personal knowledge of the 
validity of the report. Combine this lack of personal 
experience together with common biases and noise, user 
ratings may pose a serious challenge in producing useful 
information that could help other users assess the 
credibility of news sources. 
Perhaps therein lies a potentially unintended positive 
consequence. Although there may be several hurdles we 
must cross before user ratings are able to help other 
users who would consume the rating information, could 
prompting users to evaluate the truthfulness of 
articles—and asking them about their personal 
knowledge of the events described in the articles—help 
those same users who are providing the ratings? Will 
being asked to deliberately form a judgment about the 
credibility of a news article induce users to think more 
carefully about whether a social media article is true or 
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 fake? Some users may give little thought to rating and 
simply provide the first assessment that comes to mind. 
Other users may pause and realize that they actually 
have no direct way to assess the credibility of a news 
article—unless, of course, they have personally 
experienced the reported event or done extensive 
unbiased research—and this may cause them to be a bit 
more skeptical of the articles they see, both those they 
are asked to rate, as well as those they are not.  
In this paper, we investigate whether asking users to 
rate the credibility of articles they see influences their 
assessment of those articles, and whether this spills over 
to influence how credible they perceive other articles to 
be on social media. Our results show that, while users 
are still susceptible to confirmation bias, prompting 
them to evaluate the truthfulness of the articles nudges 
them to think more critically. We also found support for 
a carry-over effect; once users are asked to rate some 
articles, they remain critical toward other articles as well 
even without the rating prompt. How Facebook can 
aggregate potentially biased user ratings and present the 
information in an effective way remains an open 
question. Still, our work suggests that prompting users 
to evaluate the articles themselves may be effective in 
helping users to think more critically about the articles 
they see on social media. 
 
2. Prior Theory and Research 
Fake news has been defined as “news articles that are 
intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead 
readers” [2]. Disinformation and fake news have long 
been a problem, but fake news on social media became 
an important societal issue when it was reported that 
Russian intelligence agencies used social media to 
propagate fake news in an attempt to influence the 2016 
presidential election in the United States [2, 3]. In 
response to fake news, a number of fact-checking 
initiatives have been launched [16, 29], and fact 
checking has been shown to influence the perceived 
credibility of an author or an article [48], though the 
issue is fact-checking articles in a timely manner before 
any fake news can spread and cause damage. Fact-
checking has traditionally been done by experts (e.g., 
PolitiFact), and Facebook’s fake news flag also 
leveraged expert fact-checking in addition to user 
reports.  
An alternative solution to expert fact-checking is to 
have users rate the credibility or truthfulness of news 
articles and/or news sources. Just as eBay has users rate 
individual transactions that are aggregated into an 
overall seller rating, social media platforms could have 
users rate individual news articles which would then be 
aggregated to provide an overall news source rating. 
Alternately, users could be asked to rate the news source 
directly, without consideration of a specific news article. 
These source ratings would then be applied to articles 
when they are first published, the same way that sellers 
on eBay and other e-commerce sites have their ratings 
applied to all new products they offer for sale. Research 
shows that source ratings influence the extent to which 
users believe social media stories [25] and influence 
online news consumption [4].  
Prior research on fact checking and news source 
ratings has focused on the end result of fact checking 
and ratings (e.g., whether social media users’ beliefs 
about article credibility are influenced by fact-checking 
reports or ratings [48]). However, one unanswered 
question is whether—and how—asking a user to 
evaluate articles affects the user doing the assessment. 
Does the act of rating induce greater skepticism? Does 
it influence users to pause from undiscerningly going 
through articles and to view them with more critical 
eyes? We begin by considering how users process 
information on social media and the cognitive process 
that takes place when users are prompted to evaluate 
articles. 
 
2.1. Information processing in social media  
People use the Internet for many different purposes, 
such as accomplishing tasks or seeking hedonistic 
pleasure [49]. Most individuals use social media for 
hedonistic purposes [18], such as seeking entertainment 
or connecting with friends [23], rather than utilitarian 
purposes, such as completing work tasks. Individuals in 
a hedonistic mindset may be less likely to consider 
information critically than those with a utilitarian 
mindset, as their consumption is tied to enjoyment and 
pleasure [19].  
Facebook strives to maximize user enjoyment; 
therefore, its algorithms are designed to identify and 
display content that matches the users’ preferences, so 
users are likely to see articles that align with their 
existing beliefs [44]. Such a process causes a decrease 
in the range of information that the users encounter, and, 
as a result, Facebook users often exist in information 
“bubbles”—also referred to as echo chambers [4]—that 
reinforce their beliefs and make them believe that others 
around the world are more like them [44]. Therefore, 
many articles that users encounter on social media are 
related to topics that users have previously viewed [44] 
and have already formed an opinion about.  
Humans have two very different cognitive processes 
[24]. Many dual process models have been posed under 
a host of different names; see Evans [11] for an analysis. 
In this study, we adopt the commonly used terminology 
of Keith Stanovich [41] and Daniel Kahneman [24], 
who call these two distinct cognitive processes System 
1 and System 2 cognitions. System 1 cognition is 
Page 6603
 automatic and runs continuously,  involuntarily 
providing us with conclusions without our conscious 
thought [24]. System 1 cognition is our ‘fast thinking,’ 
where our simple heuristics produce perceptions and 
actions in less than a second [24]. System 1 is our 
intuitive decision making system [1]; when we have an 
intuition or a “gut reaction,” that is System 1 talking. 
The quick nature of System 1 is what enables us to do 
intuitive tasks without direct thought, such as walk, talk, 
recognize faces, and effortlessly retrieve certain facts 
from memory [24].  
However, System 1 comes with certain drawbacks. 
When we process information using System 1, we only 
use the information immediately at hand with the 
vividness and saliency of available information driving 
our decisions, rather than a more nuanced and carefully 
considered model [6, 24]. The associative memory 
processing of System 1 is strongly influenced by 
framing [17], because it quickly searches for confirming 
evidence of the question posed. The questions “Is Pat 
friendly?” and “Is Pat unfriendly” are fundamentally 
different questions because they trigger our System 1 to 
retrieve entirely different instances of Pat’s behavior 
[24]. As long as we can form the information into a 
coherent story—right or wrong—we are likely to follow 
our immediate System 1 response [24]. 
The second process is System 2, which involves a 
more effortful, deliberate cognition [24]. System 2, or 
“slow thinking,” takes much more time to arrive at a 
conclusion and is laborious [24, 27]. We have 
physiological symptoms that show the effort involved in 
the process: our pupils dilate, the heart rate changes, the 
blood pressure rises, and extra blood flows to different 
areas of the brain that are active [24]. Examples of 
System 2 processing are doing a standardized 
computation that requires holding numbers in working 
memory, monitoring the appropriateness of our 
behavior in tense social situations, comparing two 
products for value, and checking the validity of a 
complex argument [32].  
Because System 2 cognition requires more effort 
than System 1 cognition, humans are predisposed to 
avoid System 2 unless there is a need for it [24, 42]. We 
usually adopt the perceptions and actions produced by 
System 1 unless we are motivated to invest effort, or our 
System 1 warns us that something is wrong its result 
through feelings of unease [24].  
When users encounter information that aligns with 
their pre-existing opinions, their System 1 produces an 
instant confirmation that the information is sensible, and 
the users are inclined to believe it [9, 26, 33]. When 
users encounter information that is contrary to their 
opinions, their System 1 instantly produces a negative 
reaction because the information does not align with 
what System 1 knows to be true, resulting in cognitive 
dissonance [13]. When an individual is presented with 
two contradictory facts, both of which are plausible 
(e.g., John is honest, but a story says he lied), he/she 
must resolve the inconsistency. This can be done either 
by concluding that the two facts are not contradictory 
(e.g., John lied, but he is still honest because lying is not 
related to honesty) or by accepting one and rejecting the 
other (e.g., John is honest, and thus, I do not believe he 
lied; or John lied, and thus, I do not believe he is honest) 
[13]. 
Resolving such a cognitive dissonance takes 
cognitive effort, and humans tend to be cognitive misers 
who resist invoking System 2 and expending effort [40]. 
This tendency is exacerbated when humans are in a 
hedonistic mindset [19]. Because rejecting the new 
information is simpler cognitively than reassessing 
one’s pre-existing opinions, most people accept their 
System 1 instant conclusion; they retain their existing 
opinion and discard the new information as being false 
[9, 26, 30]. This tendency to favor information that 
confirms one’s pre-existing opinions and ignore 
information that challenges them is called confirmation 
bias [9, 26, 33]. Thus, people are more likely to believe 
information that matches their pre-existing opinions 
(i.e., attitude homophily or alignment [2, 20]). Past 
research shows that confirmation bias has a significant 
effect on the belief in articles posted on social media 
[25].  
In summary, we theorize that when a user views a 
news article on social media, their System 1 cognition 
will produce an instant assessment of the believability 
of the article based on its alignment with their prior 
opinions on the topic. The context of social media is an 
important one to study, as the influence of confirmation 
bias while in a hedonistic mindset has not been 
thoroughly studied, especially with the potential for 
confirmation bias on social media to grow, causing real, 
demonstrable changes to our political landscape [39, 
45]. Social media users are usually in a hedonistic 
mindset, so they are unlikely to invest the effort needed 
to invoke System 2 cognition to override their System 1 
results. The net effect is a belief that is heavily 
influenced by prior opinions. Therefore: 
 
H1: Pre-existing opinions on a topic directly influence 
the extent to which a news headline is perceived to be 
believable. 
 
2.2. User rating of news articles  
Users are commonly asked to rate products and services 
on the Internet. Though some ratings are fake, our focus 
in this paper is on ratings produced in good faith. When 
we ask users to rate products or services, we expect them 
to have used the product or service. When users are 
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 prompted to rate, they consider their own experiences 
and draw upon those experiences to produce the rating.  
Now, consider ratings of news articles. Unless the 
user was actually involved in the events described in a 
social media article (either as a participant or a witness), 
the user has no personal experiences to draw upon. 
Unless the user witnessed the event reported in the 
article, he/she is incapable of providing a direct 
assessment of its truthfulness because he/she has no 
personal knowledge of the facts.  Therefore, except in 
very rare circumstances where the user was a participant 
or witness of the events in the article, users will be 
unable to provide a rating based on personal knowledge 
of events, thus leading to divergent outcomes between 
individuals in assessing credibility. Now, some users 
may not have personal experience but are informed on 
the topic and have triangulated information from various 
sources. Others may accept the information based solely 
on their System 1 conclusion on the information. In the 
case of fake news articles that are complete fabrications, 
there are no actual events that anyone could have 
witnessed! The onus is then on individual user to decide 
to “look into” the issue, accept the article as fact, or 
reject the article.   
We theorize that when users are asked to rate the 
truthfulness of an article based on their personal 
experience, they will recognize that they have no 
personal knowledge on which to base a rating. Since not 
all users will recognize this without an appropriate 
prompt, we propose a rating intervention that will 
explicitly ask users if they have personal knowledge of 
the events. This explicit question will trigger the 
recognition from users that they lack the knowledge 
needed to rate the truthfulness of the article and may 
result in deeper processing of the underlying issue.  
As argued in H1, when users first see an article, their 
System 1 will produce an instant assessment of its 
believability based on confirmation bias. When users 
are then asked to provide a truthfulness rating that asks 
about personal knowledge of the event reported in the 
article, their System 1 will produce an instant answer 
that the user has no such knowledge of the event.  
There are several events that can trigger System 2 
cognition, and one of the most powerful is a discrepancy 
from normal expectations [14, 28]. When System 1 
detects that something is not normal, it produces a low 
“Feeling of Rightness” (FOR) that indicates something 
is amiss [7, 46]. A low FOR is an alert that System 1 
believes that System 2 cognition should be invoked for 
a deeper thinking. We theorize that when an individual’s 
System 1 is asked whether the user has personal 
knowledge of the events in the article and returns a 
negative answer, it will produce a low FOR, which 
would invoke System 2 cognition. 
Different individuals may choose to respond to a low 
FOR in different ways. Some individuals may have a 
high need for cognition and therefore engage System 2 
in situations when the FOR is only slightly low, while 
others may be reluctant to engage in System 2 cognition 
even when the FOR is very low [12, 22]. Empirical 
evidence suggests that most people’s System 1 is 
relatively good at producing an accurate FOR [22]. 
Whether System 2 is invoked or not depends on the 
individual’s personality, though a low FOR will be 
sufficient to invoke at least some amount of System 2 
cognition under normal conditions [22]. These users’ 
System 2 cognition will realize that they lack direct 
knowledge of the events in the story and thus cannot 
produce a truthfulness rating that is based on their own 
experiences as they would a product or service they have 
used.  
Instead, they will realize that any initial assessment 
of truthfulness will be based on their perception of the 
credibility of the article’s source and/or on the fit of the 
article’s content with their prior opinions and indirect 
knowledge about what is true or false. Both of these are 
weaker criteria than the individual’s own direct personal 
knowledge. Thus, users who invoke their System 2 
cognition will be less certain of the accuracy of their 
truthfulness assessment. They will be less likely to 
believe the news article. As mentioned before, this 
effect will be most pronounced for fake articles, which 
is where we most need it to address the issue of 
misinformation. 
An alternate mechanism for the decreased 
perception of believability of an article comes from 
increased mindfulness caused by our prompt to rate 
some headlines. Research on mindfulness suggests that 
IT mindfulness can be manipulated [43]. The most 
influential dimension of mindfulness in this research is 
the “orientation in the present” dimension. Once users 
become aware that information on social media may be 
false, they become more mindful of the potential fiction 
of the news that they see. 
In summary, we argue that changing the design of 
the current Facebook newsfeed will encourage critical 
thought. Specifically, asking users to evaluate a news 
article in a way that causes them to consider if they have 
personal knowledge of the events in the article will 
trigger a recognition that they do not have direct 
personal knowledge of the article and thus cannot 
provide an independent rating. This recognition will 
increase the likelihood that users will engage in System 
2 cognition to assess the article, and the resulting 
uncertainty will reduce the extent to which they believe 
the article. Thus: 
 
H2: Asking users to rate a news headline will reduce the 
extent to which they perceive it to be believable. 
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 The arguments above consider the direct effects of 
being asked to rate an article on the believability of that 
specific article, but are there carry-over effects? Does a 
simple design change on one article influence 
believability of future articles? Once a user realizes that 
he or she lacks the personal knowledge needed to rate 
an article, will this realization carry over to the articles 
that follow, regardless of whether the user is asked to 
rate them or not? Once an individual realizes that he or 
she lacks the direct personal knowledge to rate a specific 
article, the individual may generalize this realization to 
all articles that do not concern the individual’s own life. 
This realization cannot be “unlearned,” so once 
internalized, it will become part of the normal 
assessment of future articles. Thus, once the user has 
some experience with being asked to rate articles (and 
realizing that he or she lacks personal knowledge), then 
he or she will be less likely to believe any future articles 
(whether asked to rate or not) because the user will 
recognize the basis on which one’s belief is formed is 
less certain than a normal assessment. Thus: 
 
H3: There will be a carry-over effect such that, once 
users have been asked to rate some headlines, they will 
be less likely to perceive any headlines as believable. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Participants  
We recruited a total of 68 undergraduate participants 
from a large business core course. All were between the 
age of 18 and 24, and about 35% of them were female. 
We also collected Facebook usage and political 
affiliation information; see Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Participant group description 
 Categories Percentage 
Facebook 
Use 
Once a week or less 22% 
More than once a week 47% 
More than once a day 31% 
Political 
Affiliation 
Democrat 18% 
Moderate/Independent 57% 
Republican  25% 
 
3.2. Task  
The participants viewed 42 news headlines and reported 
the believability of each article. Of the headlines, 16 
were designed to appeal to politically left-leaning 
participants and 16 to right-leaning participants (see 
Table 2 for examples). There were also 10 that may be 
of special interest to our participants because of the 
locality of the issues the headlines described. All the 
headlines were formatted as they might appear as posts 
on Facebook, some with the user-rating treatment and 
some without (see Figure 1).  
 
Table 2: Examples of news headlines used in the 
experiment 
- Robert Mueller Encouraged to Resign over Affair with 
Nancy Pelosi 
- NFL Players Union Votes to Encourage Kneeling 
During National Anthem 
- Nancy Pelosi Said Building a Wall Will Violate Rights 
of 'Millions of Illegals' 
- Melania Trump Bans White House Staff from Taking 
Flu Shot 
- Senator Tom Cotton Called for Drug Testing for 
Social Security Recipients 
- Trump's Doctor Said the President Was 'Too Sick to 
Talk to Mueller' 
 
 Figure 1: An example of a news headline (with the 
user-rating treatment in the dotted box) 
The headlines and images were designed to avoid 
major differences in the type and magnitude of feelings 
they would generate. We used a gender-neutral name for 
the person posting—not to be confused with the original 
source who authored the article—and the comment from 
the person posting was a summary of the headline itself. 
To minimize any news source specific effect (e.g., some 
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 sources well-known and trusted by some users while 
other sources are not), we fabricated a source name that 
sounded plausible (NewsUnion.com). The URL was 
verified to be inactive prior to the experiment (i.e., not 
used by any news provider or anyone else).  
 
3.3. Treatments  
This is a repeated measures study in which 
participants received all 42 headlines. Participants 
received both the control condition (no user-rating) and 
the experimental treatment (with user-rating and no-
rating intermixed). The headlines were randomly 
assigned to treatments and presented in random order 
within treatment to control for any headline- and image-
specific effects. In a repeated measure design, there is a 
concern about the effects of an early treatment bleeding 
over into a later treatment [21, 36]. This is usually 
controlled by random treatment order or a fully crossed 
design in which all treatments orders are used equally, 
except in cases where there are likely to be meaningful 
theoretical differences in the bleed-over between 
treatments. This is the case in our study. The control 
condition is the current Facebook format, so it is 
unlikely to influence later treatments because it is the 
normal interface that users regularly use. In contrast, the 
user-rating treatment is likely to have strong influence 
on the treatments that follow it, because once users are 
asked to rate an article, we theorize that they will 
become more discerning in their consumption of 
articles; see H3. Thus, randomizing the order of 
appearance of the rating manipulation and controls 
would confound the later treatment.  
Therefore, the control condition was always 
presented first, followed by a description of the user-
rating treatment, followed by the user-rating treatment. 
The overall flow of the experiment is shown in Figure 
2. As a robustness check, we also test for any ordering 
effect that may stem from our experiment design; see 
our results section.  
 
 Figure 2: Sequence of the experiment 
Participants completed an initial survey for 
demographic information. The first treatment was the 
control condition (no user ratings) designed to mimic 
the current Facebook style of presentation as closely as 
possible. This treatment had 14 randomly assigned 
headlines.  
To test for the carry-over effect (H3), as well as for 
the user-rating effect (H2), the remaining 28 headlines 
were randomly presented with or without the user-rating 
treatment.  
 
3.4. Independent variables  
Confirmation bias was assessed using two items that 
were self-reported by participants [25]. The first was the 
participant’s position on the headline (െ3= extremely 
negative to ൅3= extremely positive). The second was 
the participant’s perceived importance of the headline 
(using a 7-point scale: Do you find the issue described 
in the article important? 1= not at all, 7= extremely). In 
other words, the former represents the direction of 
confirmation bias whereas the latter represent the 
magnitude. Putting the two together, we are able to 
measure the degree of fit between a headline and a 
participant’s prior position. The two items were 
multiplied together to form our Confirmation Bias 
variable, which ranges from െ21 to +21. This was used 
to test H1. 
To test our hypotheses, we indicated which articles 
were displayed with the user-rating prompt (User 
Rating), and which were displayed without it but after 
our participants had been exposed to the rating prompt 
(After Exposure Without Rating). These headlines 
appeared exactly as those in the control condition. The 
former variable was to test H2, whereas the latter was to 
test H3. 
Finally, we also controlled for our participants’ 
demographic factors such as gender, Facebook usage 
level, and political affiliation.  
 
3.5. Dependent variable 
The believability of each article was measured using 
three 7-point items (How believable do you find this 
article, How truthful do you find this article, How 
credible do you find this article) [25]. Reliability 
(Cronbach's alpha) was 0.96, which is adequate.  
 
4. Results 
To test our hypotheses, we performed multilevel mixed-
effects linear regression with random intercepts in Stata. 
The base case was the control condition. The results are 
reported in Table 3.   
H1 argued that confirmation bias has a positive 
effect on the believability of articles. Table 3 shows that 
confirmation bias has a significant positive effect. H1 is 
supported.  
H2 posited that user rating would affect 
believability. Table 3 shows that User Rating has a 
negative and significant effect on Believability, 
indicating that the user-rating treatment influenced the 
 
*Headlines with or without the user-rating treatment
were randomly displayed to test the carry-over effect.
Control 
Condition 
Initial 
Survey 
User-Rating 
Treatment* 
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 participants to become more critical about the 
truthfulness of the headlines they saw. We conclude that 
H2 is supported.  
We also hypothesized in H3 that user rating would 
also have a carry-over effect. On Table 3, After 
Exposure Without Rating variable measures this carry-
over effect, and it turns out to be negative and 
significant. Hence, H3 is also supported. The difference 
between the coefficient for After Exposure Without 
Rating and that for User Rating is statistically 
insignificant (χଶሺ1ሻ ൌ 0.40, p ൏ 0.527), indicating that 
the carry-over effect is as strong as the effect from the 
rating prompt. We note that gender, Facebook usage 
level, and political affiliation had no significant 
influence on believability.  
 
Table 3: Estimation Results for Believability1 
Independent Variables 
User Rating െ 0.358*** 
After Exposure Without Rating†  െ 0.312*** 
Confirmation Bias 0.431*** 
Female  0.264 
FB Use: More than once a week െ 0.054 
FB Use: More than once a day  0.076 
Democrat  െ 0.171 
Republican  0.211 
†After Exposure Without Rating refers to those headlines displayed 
without asking users to rate them (i.e., the control condition) after a 
headline asking users to rate it was presented. 
We also included post hoc tests to provide robustness 
checks for our results. As described earlier, we could not 
adopt a fully crossed design in our experiment because 
of the asymmetric bleed-over effect; placing any control 
condition after the user-rating treatment is likely to 
confound the later treatment. The sequence of our 
experiment (Figure 2) may cast doubts as to whether our 
findings stem from other ordering effects. For instance, 
some may wonder whether users simply become more 
skeptical the more articles they read. To test this, we 
divided each treatment group into two parts—first half 
of the headlines and second half—and compared 
believability; see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Testing for ordering effect 
                                                 
1 Confirmation Bias is standardized for all results.  
***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05. 
As we can see from Table 4, though the effect of 
confirmation bias was still very much present, there was 
no evidence of any ordering effect. This conclusion was 
consistent be it in the control condition group (see (a) in 
Table 4) or the user-rating treatment group (see (b) in 
Table 4). Hence, these tests further strengthen our 
finding that it was the user-rating treatment that 
influenced users to think more critically about the 
truthfulness of the articles, not some other ordering 
effect. 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results for Believability 
Independent 
Variables  (a) (b) 
First Half 0.104 0.102 
Confirmation Bias 0.339*** 0.483*** 
Female  0.378* 0.213 
FB Use: More 
than once a week 
0.026 െ 0.104 
FB Use: More 
than once a day 
0.220  െ 0.001 
Democrat  െ 0.219  െ 0.149 
Republican 0.321 0.158 
 
5. Discussion 
From our analyses, we found that participants were 
more likely to believe articles that they agreed with, 
proving that confirmation bias is a significant factor that 
amplifies the effect of fake news on social media. As a 
possible remedy, our results show that prompting users 
to evaluate the truthfulness of articles directly influences 
the extent to which users believe articles on social 
media. As theorized, the rating prompt was enough to 
nudge users to think more critically about the articles by 
gently asking them whether they really knew—from 
personal experience—if the events described in the 
articles were true or false. And once this critical filter 
was activated, it stayed active even for articles without 
the user-rating treatment. These findings are especially 
relevant given Facebook’s recent decision to have users 
to rate the credibility of articles [10]. Though knowledge 
of external facts could influence believability, the 
randomized experimental design in our study reduces 
the potential negative influence of missing variable bias. 
There are several arguments in favor of user-based 
ratings. Developing ratings directly from users may be 
easier than finding appropriate experts and 
compensating them for their ratings. There are more 
users available to rate articles than experts, and 
voluntary ratings from consumers will cost nothing. 
After all, that is how we do ratings on the Internet for 
 
Control 
Condition 
7 headlines 7 headlines 
(a) 
 User-Rating Treatment 
14 headlines 14 headlines 
(b) 
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 products and services. Facebook decided that this is 
their next move [10], hopefully adding credibility to 
news consumption by prioritizing articles from sources 
that the users have deemed to be reputable. 
Unfortunately, such crowdsourced rating approaches 
also have several problems that need to be ironed out 
before the rating methods can produce a useful reference 
that can influence users’ behavior in a meaningful way 
[8]. After all, while people rate products and services 
based on their personal experience, the same cannot be 
expected for news. 
However, this very limitation of crowdsourced 
rating of news—i.e., the lack of personal experience of 
the events described in the news—may have a positive 
upside. Our work shows that the prompt of asking users 
to evaluate the truthfulness of the articles itself can 
remind the users that they do not have the necessary 
personal experience to judge whether the articles are 
true or not, helping them to think more critically about 
the articles. This effect is important because, as shown 
in prior research [25], believability has strong effects on 
the actions that users take, such as reading, liking, 
commenting, and sharing. Just as sharing of articles 
contributes to news—fake or not—going viral, clicking 
the Like button or commenting on an article may also 
spread the news farther and faster due to the appearance 
of the post in other users’ news feeds. Hence, invoking 
the critical filter in users’ minds—and encouraging them 
to be more careful in their sharing of information—is an 
important first step in tackling the issue of fake news. 
 
5.1. Implications for future research   
The prevalence of news consumption on social media 
[15], combined with the hedonistic, entertainment-
seeking goals of social media use [23] that trigger 
confirmation bias, suggests that news consumption on 
social media may not be mindful. Mindfulness can have 
significant impacts on the way we use technology, for 
better or worse. In this research, we begin to address the 
issue of mindfulness in social media consumption. We 
believe that asking users to evaluate articles is one step 
towards inducing more mindful consumption, but more 
research needs to be done on other ways to trigger a 
more mindful behavior. 
Largely, we can categorize the issues around the 
rating approaches for the problem of fake news into the 
production of ratings and the consumption of them. In 
this paper, we focused on the production side of the 
ratings and how the action of collecting the rating 
information from users may actually influence their 
behaviors. 
We need more research on the production side of 
ratings, the different procedures, and pros and cons 
associated with those procedures. One fundamental 
concern about crowdsourced ratings is that users may 
lack the knowledge needed to verify the facts in articles 
because they may not have personally witnessed the 
events in the article. User ratings are common on the 
web, and we generally accept them as somewhat reliable 
indicators of underlying quality, but it is not entirely 
clear whether this assumption is true, especially in the 
context of news. Since most users simply lack the 
expertise and experience to judge the truthfulness of 
articles, the result may be articles rated by their fit with 
users’ pre-existing beliefs and users being shown more 
articles that fit their beliefs, causing the filter bubbles to 
worsen.  
Also, for crowdsourced ratings to be successful, the 
level of participation is crucial. For product and service 
ratings, consumers have various incentives to leave their 
feedback. They feel invested as they have paid for the 
products and services. However, unlike product and 
service ratings where the process of rating is easier to 
understand, news article ratings may not be as easily 
understood. When fake news articles continually show 
up, will the users’ participation in rating news stories 
remain high or will the users feel flustered and develop 
a sense of helplessness and stop contributing? If user 
attrition is a concern, perhaps expert rating may be a 
better solution in the long run.  
Though we are mainly concerned with user article 
rating in this paper, there may be many other ways of 
collecting rating information. For instance, compared to 
Facebook’s proposed user rating approach, expert rating 
approaches have some obvious benefits [8]. Expert 
ratings of articles (i.e., fact checking) are fairly well 
understood with many services available (e.g., 
PolitiFact). Aggregating those services to produce 
source level ratings is straightforward, though the 
timeliness of the rating is still a concern.  
On the consumption side of rating information, 
given that there are different ways of producing source 
ratings, we should investigate whether different rating 
approaches have differing impacts on the users. If the 
ratings came from regular users assessing older stories 
(as Amazon and eBay for past purchases), would they 
have a stronger or weaker effect on believability than 
ratings from a panel of experts? If the ratings came from 
the users, would the mechanisms of rating matter? 
Would user ratings of the source be perceived 
differently than user ratings of individual articles? 
Would there be meaningful differences in how the users 
interpret these ratings from different sources and 
mechanisms? We need more research on ways to 
compile and present ratings of social media stories.  
Presentation format of rating information is also 
important in influencing users’ behaviors. For instance, 
Facebook had to roll back their flagging approach 
because it proved to be ineffective. One possible reason 
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 is that the users simply did not understand what the flags 
meant. If Facebook educated users on the flags (through 
banners and TV campaigns), would they have been 
more effective? What if the flags had a more eye-
catching icon and stronger wording to trigger System 1 
and 2 cognitions? Research has shown that users’ 
behavior may change even with a subtle change in the 
interface, such as displaying the news source before the 
headline [25]. Therefore, it is important to investigate 
how the rating information should be presented to 
maximize its influence on the users. 
Another important implication from our research is 
the role of confirmation bias. From Table 3, we see that 
a one standard deviation change in confirmation bias 
(which is standardized) has a larger effect than the user-
rating treatment. In other words, a user’s belief in a 
social media article is influenced more by his/her desire 
for it to be true than by the push from the rating prompt. 
Fortunately, the rating prompt nearly compensates for 
the influence of confirmation bias. In addition to 
investigating other ways to help users think more 
critically when consuming news on social media, we 
need more research on confirmation bias and how it 
affects our beliefs in news stories, especially fake news 
stories.  
Finally, in this work, we held constant the person 
sharing the article with the participant. Would it matter 
who shared the article and their relationship to the user, 
who liked it, and how many people commented on it? 
More research is needed to better understand how who 
shares an article influences its believability and the 
actions users take.   
 
5.2. Implications for practice   
The public is starting to recognize the role of social 
media providers and search engine providers in the 
spread of fake news and is calling for more proactive 
measures. We approached the problem of fake news 
from the opposite direction from many other 
researchers, who have started by first building 
prototypes and then testing if they affect believability 
[35, 38]; we started by first testing if the prompt of 
asking users to rate the articles they see on social media 
would influence them to think more critically about the 
truthfulness of those articles. In so doing, we aim to 
provide evidence-based design advice. 
As discussed earlier, figuring out how to make 
crowdsourced rating is going to be challenging, and that 
may be the basis to push for expert rating instead [8]. 
However, different rating methods need not be mutually 
exclusive, and we can adopt different approaches 
together (e.g., user rating with expert rating). Figuring 
out the best way to collect and provide rating 
information must be a long-term endeavor. However, 
we find that user rating has a rather immediate benefit, 
and it only requires a cosmetic change to the interface 
which is likely to be low cost.  
The key idea is to momentarily stop users from 
mindlessly consuming news on social media by asking 
them to evaluate the articles. Perhaps, other ways to stop 
the stream of mindless consumption may also prove to 
be effective. Currently, most of (if not all) Facebook 
surveys and rating prompts (e.g., Would you 
recommend this place?) do not come with any submit 
button or confirmation prompt. All that users have to do 
is to click on an option, and the response is submitted. 
Following Facebook’s current practice, we also 
designed this experiment in that fashion. However, if 
there was an extra step that further prompted users to 
think about their response (e.g., Are you sure?), it may 
have a greater impact on the users’ behavior.  
In this work, we investigated a possible positive side 
effect in asking users to rate news articles on social 
media. The jury is still out on whether such a 
crowdsourced rating mechanism would be effective in 
generating useful information for readers to evaluate the 
truthfulness of the articles they see. That being said, our 
work shows that there may be merits in asking users to 
rate the news articles they see on social media. It is a 
low hanging fruit that Facebook (and other social media 
for that matter) may want to consider regardless of their 
long-term plans and alternative options. 
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